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2A- 5/ 4/95 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 870, 
PATCHOGUE-MEDFORD SCHOOL UNIT, 
Charging—Party-, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15330 
PATCHOGUE-MEDFORD UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT REILLY of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG, GROSS, RICHMOND, HEIDELBERGER, 
REICH & SCRICCA (CHRISTOPHER VENATOR of counsel), for 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Local 870, Patchogue-Medford School Unit (CSEA) to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing its charge that the 
Patchogue-Medford Union Free School District (District) violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally furloughed employees in CSEA's unit for one 
conference day without pay. The ALT decided that CSEA had 
waived its right to negotiate the District's decision to furlough 
and that the District's action was consistent with the past 
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practice that existed between the parties regarding the 
assignment of these unit employees. 
CSEA alleges in its exceptions that the ALT erred in finding 
a waiver and in determining that the District's actions were 
consistent with its prior implementation of the contract clause 
in issue. The District supports the ALJ7s decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties7 arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The District employs kindergarten, computer and library 
aides in its elementary schools. The aides work three hours a 
day, assisting the classroom teachers, who teach for six hours a 
day. For several years, aides have been scheduled to work on 
parent-teacher conference days, even though the instructional 
days are shortened and the aides have no involvement in the 
conferences themselves. On November 18, 1993, a parent-teacher 
conference day was scheduled, with students to be in attendance 
for only two hours and fifteen minutes. The District announced 
that the services of the aides would not be needed on that day 
and that, therefore, the aides would not be paid. Bruce Singer, 
Assistant Superintendent of Business, testified that he decided 
to furlough the aides on November 18 because of the District's 
financial difficulties. 
The District points to Article II, §G of the parties7 July 
1, 1991 - June 30, 1994 collective bargaining agreement as, in 
relevant respect, a source of right to the District. That 
article provides, in relevant part: 
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Differentiated Schedules 
Subject to the provisions of Section C of the Article, 
the scheduling of the work of any member of the 
operational unit shall be at the discretion of the 
District and dependent on the times when such services 
are needed by the District. . . .-1 
Pursuant to this provision, the District had not scheduled the 
kindergarten aides to work on the last two days of the 1992-1993 
school year. In 1989, the District had likewise determined that 
certain instructional and special education aides would not be 
needed on parent-teacher conference days. The collective 
bargaining agreement also guarantees 180 days of work a year to 
the food service workers and the monitor aides, but is silent as 
to the aides in issue.-'' 
CSEA argues that the lanrruar*e of Article II ^G cannot be 
construed as a waiver since it does not specifically address 
parent-teacher conference days and it must be read in conjunction 
with Article II, §C, which sets forth a Monday through Friday 
workweek. We do not find CSEA's argument to be persuasive. A 
waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right which 
^Article II, §C reads: 
Work Week 
The normal work week for all employees shall be Monday 
through Friday, except for those employees who are 
hired for a different normal work week. 
^Article II, §E(2) provides: 
Food Service Workers, Monitor Aides 
Food service workers and monitor aides shall be 
) guaranteed at least one hundred eighty (180) days of 
work in accordance with their regular schedule. 
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"must be clear, unmistakable and without ambiguity."-7 The 
language of Article II, §G clearly gives the District the right 
to determine whether and when the aides are needed to work. The 
only restrictions are that the normal workweek is Monday through 
Friday and that certain other unit employees are guaranteed a 
minimum of 180 days of work per year. Neither of those 
contractual provisions restricts the District's contractual right 
to determine that the aides were not required to work on the 
parent-teacher conference day during the normal workweek. 
Moreover, the at-issue action is consistent with the 
District's past practice and, apparently, the parties' joint 
interpretation of the agreement since, with respect to the 
scheduling of the aides, on two nrior occasions the District 
determined that aides were not required to work and did not 
schedule them or pay them for those days. 
CSEA's exceptions must, therefore, be dismissed and the 
ALJ's decision affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pau ine,R. Kinsella, ( <^r Chairperson 
^CSEA v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 7011, at 7022 (3d Dep't 
1982), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 775, 15 PERB [^7020 (1982). 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, MONROE COUNTY 
LOCAL 828, MONROE COUNTY EMPLOYEE UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15287 
COUNTY OF MONROE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
) BARRY C. WATKINS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Monroe (County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) finding that the County had violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
.Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
subcontracted services provided by employees in a unit 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Monroe County Local 828, Monroe 
County Employee Unit (CSEA). The County argued that the work 
subcontracted was not exclusively bargaining unit work, that its 
use of a private contractor was temporary, and that it had 
J 
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changed by the subcontract the level of service it was providing 
to its constituency. 
The County operates Monroe County Hospital (MCH). CSEA 
represents the employees in MCH's Environmental Services 
Department (Department), which provides the cleaning service at 
MCH. Lynda Zimmer, a bargaining unit member, is the Supervisor 
of the Department and oversees the work of the building service 
workers, who are also unit members. For eight years, Zimmer, in 
addition to her day-to-day supervisory duties, has been 
responsible for pest control maintenance and staff training in 
cleaning, health and safety, and she has ordered supplies and 
equipment for the Department. 
On December 20, 1993, the County entered into a three-year 
agreement with Servicemaster Company to provide equipment 
maintenance, supplies, training and other services, including 
pest control.-7 While no County employees were displaced by the 
contracting with Servicemaster, the ALJ found that the County had 
violated the Act by unilaterally contracting out training of 
staff in cleaning and safety procedures and supply ordering.-7 
The County excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that she 
erred in finding the work to be exclusive unit work, that the 
-
7The contract has laundry and linen components which are not in 
issue. 
-
7The ALJ found that pest control maintenance was not exclusive 
to the bargaining unit and she did not find a violation in that 
) regard. No exceptions have been filed with respect to that part 
of the ALJ's decision. 
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work was not temporary in nature and that the County had not 
changed its level of service. CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties7 arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Most of the work now being done by Michael Ruszaj, 
Servicemaster's coordinator-'' with MCH, was previously performed 
by Zimmer. Zimmer designed and implemented a training program 
for new employees in basic cleaning techniques, patient 
interaction, safety and accident prevention and infection 
control,-7 a program that involved two to three training hours a 
day for four or five days, including demonstrations and video 
tapes. After completing training and passing a written test, the 
new employees were assigned to clean with an experienced 
employee. Training in the use of new equipment and supplies was 
always done by the vendor of the product;-/ fire safety training 
was done by a local fire department employee. 
-'It appears that Ruszaj is the individual identified in the 
agreement between Servicemaster and the County as the 
Administrative Director of Physical Support Services and that the 
duties required of Servicemaster by the agreement include 
maintenance of time records, furnishing of data to MCH for the 
formulation of its payroll, and the provision and maintenance of 
all training equipment and materials, schedules and procedures 
for training employees of MCH. 
-/There was a mandatory annual in-service training program for 
all building service workers. The accident prevention training 
was provided by Matt Morrison and the infection control training 
was done by Rachel Gaffney. Both are employees in the CSEA unit. 
-/Such training was usually part of the purchase agreement and 
was done to reduce MCH's liability. 
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Zimmer was also responsible for the ordering of all supplies 
and equipment. If the supplies were already in MCH's inventory, 
Zimmer simply ordered them from stock. To purchase new equipment 
and supplies, Zimmer would deal directly with the vendor. She 
only needed prior approval of an order, from Thomas Yale, 
Assistant Director of Patient Services, if the purchase amount 
was over $500. 
Zimmer wrote the original bid for pest control services. 
After MCH contracted with an exterminator, Zimmer would note 
sightings and complaints and arrange for at least an annual 
cleaning and spraying. Claire Bovier, Director of the Food 
Service Department, has also contacted the exterminator directly 
about pest control. 
Ruszaj now conducts all training of new building service 
workers at MCH. He provides video tapes and one-on-one training, 
and calls in other Servicemaster employees, as needed, for 
assistance. All equipment and supplies are provided by 
Servicemaster. Except for the brand name, they are the same as 
those previously used under Zimmer's supervision. Health and 
safety training is limited to the viewing of videotapes. Ruszaj, 
with input from Zimmer's assistant, has determined the level of 
materials needed at MCH. A monthly inventory is now done and 
Ruszaj replenishes the supplies by orders to Servicemaster. 
Ruszaj makes notations of pest sightings and he has met with the 
contract exterminator. 
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The County first excepts to the introduction of evidence 
which covered the time frame between the filing of the instant 
charge, on January 25, 1994, and the hearing. The County argues 
that only evidence of facts in existence before the charge was 
filed can be introduced by CSEA. We do not agree. Here, CSEA 
merely introduced evidence during its case that the work that was 
transferred to and was being performed by Servicemaster was 
substantially the same as the work previously performed 
exclusively by unit employees, primarily Zimmer, and that the 
County had not changed the level of service or qualifications for 
doing the work during the time from the date the contract was 
entered into between the County and Servicemaster and the date of 
the hearing. This evidence was properly accepted by the ALJ. 
The County also asserts that it contracted with 
Servicemaster to upgrade performance and technology at MCH. The 
County claims that since January 1, 1994, it has lowered its 
costs as well as increased the quality of its service. However, 
the record does not reflect a substantial change in the nature of 
the tasks performed, the quality of performance or the 
qualifications for performing the work since it has been 
undertaken by Servicemaster.-1 
The County further argues that CSEA does not have 
exclusivity over the work now being performed by Servicemaster. 
With the exception of the pest control maintenance, which is not 
&/See State of New York (DOCS) , 27 PERB H3055 (1994) . 
^ 
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before us, the training of new employees in basic cleaning, 
health and safety has always been done by unit employees. 
Although the fire safety training is not exclusive to the unit, 
it is a specialized area of training, which, while important, 
does not constitute a large portion of the training of new 
employees. A discernible boundary may be reasonably drawn around 
that work. As such, the performance of fire safety training by 
nonunit employees does not disturb CSEA's exclusivity over the 
cleaning and safety training generally or the ordering of 
supplies previously performed by unit employees.-7 
The County lastly argues that Servicemaster is only training 
employees on a temporary basis, until they become familiar with 
Servicemaster's methods and materials. However, Ruszaj did not 
just train Zimmer to enable her to train the building service 
workers; he has undertakento train all the employees in the 
Department. Additionally, the County's contract with 
Servicemaster is for three years. A three-year contract which 
removes virtually all of the duties of at least one unit position 
is far from a temporary or de minimus action. We have previously 
held that any assignment of unit work outside the unit, 
regardless of its scope or duration, is a violation of the 
Act.-7 As we held in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority: 
Z/See County of Onondaga. 24 PERB ^3014 (1991), conf'd, 187 
A.D.2d 1014, 25 PERB <J[7015 (4th Dep't 1992), motion for leave to 
appeal denied, 81 N.Y.2d 706, 26 PERB fl7003 (1993); Town of West 
Seneca, 19 PERB 1(3028 (1986) . 
g/See New York City Transit Auth. , 19 PERB [^3043 (1986) . 
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Even if no individual employees suffer a direct, 
immediate and specifically identifiable detriment to 
their terms and conditions of employment, their rights 
of organization and representation may be diminished if 
the scope of the negotiating unit is reduced.-7 
We find, therefore, that the County's contracting of the 
cleaning and safety training and the supply ordering 
responsibilities to Servicemaster, without negotiations with 
CSEA, violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the County's 
exceptions and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Restore the training in cleaning and safety and the 
supply ordering responsibilities to the unit represented by CSEA; 
2. Make whole any unit employees who may have suffered a 
loss or diminution in pay or benefits or a change in terms and 
conditions of employment as a result of the subcontracting of the 
above duties to Servicemaster; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to post notices of information to unit employees 
employed at the Monroe Community Hospital. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
l 
^ 1 8 PERB J [3083 , a t 3182 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Monroe County Local 828, Monroe County Employee Unit (CSEA) that the County of Monroe will: 
1. Restore the training in cleaning and safety and the supply ordering responsibilities to the unit represented 
by CSEA. 
2. Make whole any unit employees who may have suffered a loss or diminution in pay or benefits or a change 
in terms and conditions of employment as a result of the subcontracting of the above duties to Servicemaster 
Company. 
i. 
Dated By , 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF MONROE 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTH COLONIE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
CASE NO. E-1859 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES, INC. (JOSEPH A. IGOE), for Employer 
RICHARD GREENSPAN, P.C. (STUART A. WEINBERGER of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United 
Public Service Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United 
Industry Workers District Council 424 (Local 424) to a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) designating as confidential, in accordance with the 
criteria set forth in §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act)-7, the following employees of the South 
-' Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any 
person holding a position by appointment or employment in 
the service of a public employer, except that such term 
shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this 
article other than sections two hundred ten and two hundred 
eleven of this article,...persons...who may reasonably be 
designated from time to time as managerial or confidential 
upon application of the public employer to the appropriate 
board....Employees may be designated as managerial only if 
they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who may 
reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to 
assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of 
collective negotiations or to have a major role in the 
j administration of agreements or in personnel administration 
provided that such role is not of a routine or clerical 
nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment. 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if they are 
persons who assist and act in a confidential capacity to 
managerial employees described in clause (ii)." 
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Colonie Central School District (District): Carol Loson, Sr. 
Typist to Leonora Boehlert, the Administrative Assistant for 
Personnel; Joyce Gay, Sr. Typist to Theodore Gilkey, the 
Assistant Superintendent for Instruction; Beverly Miller, 
Treasurer/Principal Account Clerk to Peter Haessig, the Assistant 
Superintendent for Management Services; and Jeanette Abbate, Sr. 
Typist to John DeSanto, the Administrative Assistant for 
Business/Purchasing Agent. The District supports the Director's 
decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director.-7 
Boehlert is responsible for all the District's personnel 
actions, including hiring, firing, probation, discipline, second 
step grievances and arbitrations. She is a member of each of the 
District's five negotiating teams. Loson is Boehlert's secretary 
and does all of her typing and handles all of her correspondence, 
which includes grievance responses, negotiations proposals, 
minutes of negotiation sessions and Labor-Management Committee 
meetings, probationary extensions, and disciplinary reports. 
Boehlert is clearly a managerial employee.-7 
-'No exceptions have been filed with respect to the Director's 
dismissal of the application as to Linda Gordiman, Sr. Account 
Clerk/Typist; we, therefore, do not consider it. 
5/Act, §201.7(a). See also Town of Greece, 27 PERB [^3024 (1994). 
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Boehlert's secretary, Loson-7, who has access to materials 
which relate directly to the District's strategies and positions 
on contract proposals, grievance settlements and disciplinary 
actions, was appropriately designated as confidential by the 
Director.-7 A confidential designation is warranted even though 
Boehlert has not given Loson material which relates to Local 
424's unit. The District's strategies and proposals in one unit 
are generally relevant to negotiations in its other units and an 
employee with access to such information falls within the 
statutory definition of a confidential employee. 
The Assistant Superintendent for Instruction, Gilkey, is 
responsible for the District's instructional program, including 
staffing and budget. He is second in command at the District, 
serving in the Superintendent's place when he is not available. 
He is the second level in the discipline procedure for teachers 
and is the first level for administrators. Gilkey is consulted 
about District proposals and responses both before and during 
negotiations and is also consulted on the handling of grievances 
and proceedings before PERB. He is currently working on several 
-'In its exceptions, Local 424 alleges for the first time that 
Loson is no longer employed by the District and that a new 
employee has replaced her. No facts were provided in support of 
this allegation. We note, further, that successor employees are 
covered by managerial or confidential designations so long as 
their duties are substantially the same as the duties which were 
relied on to support the original designation. Rome City Sch. 
Dist. . 18 PERB «[3032 (1985). 
^Yonkers Public Library, 11 PERB [^3091 (1978) . 
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different aspects of a plan for the District to reduce the number 
of teachers and administrators. 
Gay is his secretary and as such has access to all work that 
flows through his office. Gilkey, by virtue of his role in 
making staffing level determinations, as well as his involvement 
with grievances, contract proposals and PERB proceedings, is a 
managerial employee. Gay's daily access to his correspondence, 
memoranda and files warrants her designation as confidential.-7 
The District's Assistant Superintendent for Business, 
Haessig, is responsible for the District's financial operation 
and serves on two of the District's negotiating teams. He is 
also the second step in the grievance procedure for the 
District's four support staff units. His role in the development 
of the District's budget and administration of its financial 
operation, as well as his negotiations and grievance 
responsibilities, clearly demonstrate that he is a managerial 
employee. 
Miller works directly for Haessig. She is responsible for 
maintaining and updating salary analyses, recording all revenues 
and expenditures and investing the District's revenues. She has 
done cost analyses for Haessig, comparing the relative costs of 
proposed salary levels and benefit packages during negotiations 
and budget forecasts, predicting fund balances. As the 
District's Treasurer and its "accountant", as Haessig 
-''See Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth. , 10 
PERB H3094, aff'g 10 PERB 54037 (1977). 
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characterized her, Miller knows how much money the District has, 
where all the District's funds are located and which are 
encumbered. As the Director noted: "Miller is aware of the 
District's monetary bottom line", which warrants her designation 
as confidential.-7 
DeSanto, the District's Administrative Assistant for 
Business/Purchasing Agent, is responsible for the District's 
budget office operations. He is a member of the negotiating 
teams for the District's four support staff units. DeSanto 
prepares the minutes of each negotiating session to be 
distributed to members of the District's teams. These minutes 
not only recite what occurred during the negotiations themselves, 
but what was discussed privately during caucuses of the District 
team and during meetings with any mediator or fact finder. 
DeSanto is, therefore, a managerial employee. 
Abbate is his secretary and types any minutes he prepares, 
labelling them "confidential" and seeing to their distribution to 
members of the District's negotiating teams. As Abbate has 
access to these minutes, which reflect the District's 
discussions, positions, and strategies during negotiations, she 
is privy to confidential labor relations information and is 
appropriately designated confidential.-7 
We, therefore, dismiss Local 424's exceptions and 
z/Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist. . 16 PERB [^3017 (1983). 
g/See Citv Sch. Dist. of the City of Glen Cove, 19 PERB fl3 017 
(1986) . 
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affirm the decision of the Director designating Carol Loson, Sr. 
Typist to the Administrative Assistant for Personnel; Joyce Gay, 
Sr. Typist to the Assistant Superintendent for Instruction; 
Beverly Miller, Principal Account Clerk/Treasurer to the 
Assistant Superintendent for Management Services, and Jeannette 
Abbate, Sr. Typist to the Administrative Assistant for 
Business/Purchasing Agent, as confidential. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LACKAWANNA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and= CASE^NO.^U-12754-
LACKAWANNA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
SUSAN D. COTELLESSA, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JOSEPH V. DEREN, ESQ. and HODGSON, RUSS, ANDREWS, WOODS & 
GOODYEAR (JEFF SWIATEK of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Lackawanna 
Teachers Association (Association) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing its charge that the 
Lackawanna City School District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
subcontracted the work of a cosmetology teacher and two machine 
shop teachers, represented by the Association, to the Board of 
Cooperative Educational Services, First Supervisory District, 
Erie County (BOCES) .-' 
-''The charge also included an allegation that the District had 
improperly subcontracted the work of the attendance teacher. The 
parties requested a bifurcated proceeding to enable them to 
continue their attempts to resolve that aspect of the charge. 
The ALJ's decision, therefore, dealt only with the cosmetology 
teacher and the machine shop teachers. 
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The ALT dismissed the charge on the basis of the Court of 
Appeal's decision in Webster Central School District v. PERB.-7 
The Court there held that Education Law, §1950(4)(bb) reflects 
the Legislature's intention to remove from mandatory negotiations 
the decision of a school district to contract with a BOCES for 
the provision of services previously provided by the school 
district.-7 
The Association does not except to the ALT's decision on its 
demand to negotiate the decision to subcontract. Rather, it 
excepts solely on the ground that the ALJ did not find that the 
District had violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act by refusing to 
negotiate the impact of its decision to subcontract. The 
District has submitted no statement with respect to the ALJ's 
decision or the Association's exceptions. 
Based on the following, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The matter was submitted to the ALJ for decision on a 
stipulated record. Nowhere in the stipulation is there evidence 
that the Association demanded negotiations on the impact of the 
District's June 19, 1991 decision to subcontract the work of its 
cosmetology teacher or machine shop teachers to BOCES or that the 
District refused a demand to negotiate impact. Indeed, the 
Association's letter to the District demanding negotiations on 
s/75 N.Y.2d 619, 23 PERB 57013 (1990). 
^Section 1950(4)(bb) provides: "Boards of cooperative 
educational services may provide academic and other programs and 
services in the school year on a cooperative basis, including 
summer programs and services." 
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the decision to subcontract makes no mention of impact 
bargaining.-7 The Association did not allege a failure to 
negotiate the impact of the District's subcontracting decision in 
its charge or in its brief to the ALT. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the ALT erred 
when she failed to order the District to negotiate impact because 
the demand to negotiate impact was implicit in its demand to 
negotiate the subcontracting decision. It is simply not 
reasonable, however, to infer a refusal to bargain impact issues 
from a charge which alleges only a failure to bargain the 
decision, and it is clear that prior to the filing of exceptions, 
neither party did so. It remains to be decided, therefore, 
whether this claim is properly made for the first time in the 
Association's exceptions. We have often held that facts which 
are included for the first time in the exceptions may not be 
considered in support of the charge.-7 Our review is limited to 
the record as it was developed before the ALJ.-7 As the 
^
7The July 3, 1991 letter states: 
The Lackawanna Teachers' Federation demands to 
negotiate the decision to sub-contract the two (2) 
Machine Shop and one (1) Cosmetology position at the 
Lackawanna High School. 
We request a meeting immediately to resolve this 
situation. 
^'County of Suffolk, 26 PERB J[3076 (1993) ; Oswego City Sch. 
Dist. , 25 PERB [^3052 (1992). 
^Margolin v. Newman. 130 A.D.2d 312, 20 PERB f7018 (3d Dep't 
1987), appeal dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 844, 21 PERB [^7005 (1988); 
Town of Greece, 26 PERB ^3004 (1993). 
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Association never raised against the District a claim of failure 
to negotiate impact in either its charge, the stipulation of 
facts or in its brief to the ALJ, we cannot consider it when 
raised for the first time in the exceptions. The facts as set 
forth in the charge and the stipulated record provide no evidence 
that a demand to negotiate impact was ever made by the 
Association. Such a demand must be clearly made; it cannot be 
inferred from a demand to negotiate a decision as impact and 
decisional bargaining rights and obligations are different.-1 
The Association's exceptions must, therefore, be dismissed 
and the ALJ's decision affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
-'See County of Nassau (Nassau County Police Dep't), 27 PERB 
f3054 (1994);, for a detailed discussion of the difference between 
) decisional and impact bargaining. See also City of Rochester, 
17 PERB 53082 (1984). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) and Local 144, Long Island Division, Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO (SEIU) to a declaratory ruling made 
after a hearing by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
Board - DR-053 -2 
and Representation (Director). The Director ruled that United 
Public Service Employees Union, Local 424 (Local 424), A Division 
of United Industry Workers District Council 424 (District 
Council), following our decision finding Local 424 not to be an 
employee organization within the meaning of §201.5 of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act),-' had made changes in 
their constitutions sufficient to bring Local 424 within that 
definition. Specifically, the Director concluded that the 
constitutional changes afforded Local 424 "sufficient autonomy to 
carry out the duties and responsibilities of a negotiating agent" 
under the Act. 
CSEA and SEIU argue that the record does not establish that 
Local 424 is now free from the District Council's domination or 
control. Local 424 argues in response that the Director was 
correct in concluding that the changes made in its relationship 
with the District Council are sufficient to satisfy all of the 
concerns we have articulated about Local 424's ability to serve 
as a certified bargaining agent. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we affirm the Director's ruling and conclude that 
Local 424 as presently constituted meets the definition of an 
employee organization in §2 01.5 of the Act. 
^Northport/E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist. , 27 PERB [^3 053, 
motion for reconsideration den. , 27 PERB ^3061 (1994), conf'd sub 
nom. Boyle v. PERB, 28 PERB }[7001 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1995) . 
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In our earlier decision, we held that provisions in the 
constitutions of Local 424 and the District Council affirmatively 
prevented Local 424 from having or exercising the autonomy 
minimally necessary to enable it to serve as the statutory 
negotiating agent for public employees. Those constitutions have 
been amended. Although certain of the provisions which we 
mentioned in our earlier decision have not been changed, that 
decision was based upon the cumulative effect of many 
constitutional provisions examined in the totality of the 
circumstances. The issue before us, therefore, is only whether 
the changes made are sufficient to require a change of result 
from our earlier decision. To that end, and as always, our 
interpretations of the controlling statutory definition are not 
intended to effect any one type of employee organization 
structure, any single pattern of employee organization 
affiliation, or any single model of collective negotiations, lest 
the right of employees to "organize and bargain collectively 
through organizations of their own choosing be unnecessarily 
circumscribed. Il-/ Consistent with the Act's policy in this 
respect, our past and current practice is to examine an 
organization's internal affairs and operations only to the extent 
necessary to make the threshold jurisdictional determination that 
a petitioner seeking representation rights is an employee 
organization within the meaning of the Act. For all other 
&21 PERB 53053, at 3113. 
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relevant purposes, a union's structure, operations and policies 
are simply points to be considered by employees in making 
decisions regarding their choice of a negotiating agent or their 
membership in that organization. 
Kevin E. Boyle, Jr., the President of Local 424 and the 
General Executive Vice-President of the District Council, was the 
only witness at the hearing held on this matter. As argued by 
SEIU, we find certain aspects of Boyle's testimony are not 
credible or are evasive.-; However, our decision in this matter 
is based upon the written constitutional provisions and other 
uncontroverted facts not subject to any credibility assessment. 
As summarized by the Director, and as described more 
completely in his decision, the constitutional amendments 
exempted Local 424 from being bound automatically to all District 
Council constitutional amendments and empowered Local 424 to 
amend its own constitution without the District Council's 
approval. Local 424 now also has ownership and control of its 
statutory dues and fees and has the specific power to incur debt, 
to use its revenue, and to pay its own expenses. 
Despite these constitutional amendments and certain 
operational changes reflecting Local 424's recent empowerment, 
there remains some potential for the District Council to control 
-'Boyle testified, for example, that he could not recall any of 
the particulars of a meeting of Local 424 which he said was held 
to discuss the constitutional changes in issue in this 
proceeding, including the number or identity of any of the 
attendees. 
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Local 424. However, the stated purposes of the relevant 
constitutional amendments are to permit Local 424 to have 
discretion over its affairs and its representation of public 
employees and to expand Local 424's authority in these respects. 
At this juncture, the amendments actually made are fairly and 
appropriately read in light of those declared purposes. There 
is, therefore, no reason to presume that any of the facially 
acceptable constitutional provisions or operational relationships 
will be used by the District Council to deprive Local 424 of the 
independence required by our first decision. Should the 
potential for the District Council's control become manifest by 
actual practice, we have full authority to take the steps 
appropriate to ensure the requisite autonomy of Local 424 and to 
protect the statutory rights of any public employees it may 
represent. 
We have considered the several indicia of the District 
Council's continued domination or control of Local 424 as alleged 
by CSEA and SEIU, and conclude that the constitutional 
impediments which we previously found to exist to Local 424's 
right and power to serve as a recognized or certified negotiating 
agent for units of public employees have been removed. All 
elements of the statutory definition of an employee organization 
are satisfied and, therefore, we rule, in agreement with the 
J 
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Director, that Local 424 is an employee organization within the 
meaning of the Act.-7 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pau Line R. Kinsella, C Chairpe 2ESOTL_^^ 
-''Local 424 has withdrawn its recusal motion and "any objection it 
has with respect to [Chairperson Kinsella's or Member Schmertz's] 
participating and determining matters and issues involving Local 
424 before the Board". Moreover, Supreme Court has determined that 
Local 424 has not set forth any ground for recusal of any Board 
member. 
2 F - 5/ 4/95 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOLVAY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE-NO.—U-14623 
SOLVAY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
SUSAN L. KING, for Charging Party 
BERNARD G. PERRY, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Solvay 
Union Free School District (District) to a.decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the District 
against the Solvay Teachers Association (Association). The 
District alleges in its charge that the Association violated 
§209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
insisting upon the continuation in a successor agreement of a 
clause in the parties' expired agreement which the District 
alleges is not mandatorily negotiable. 
The clause in issue provides as follows: 
No member of the bargaining unit will be 
disciplined, reprimanded, reduced in rank or 
compensation or deprived of any professional 
advantage without just cause. 
The ALJ concluded that the Association had presented this demand 
to fact-finding, the point of insistence for purposes of 
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assessing charges such as this one.-7 A fact-finding report was 
not issued, however, because the parties thereafter reached a 
tentative agreement, although agreement was not reached on the 
disputed clause. Instead, the parties agreed that the 
negotiability determination would control the inclusion or 
exclusion of the clause from their successor agreement. If held 
nonmandatory, the clause would be excluded from the new 
agreement; if mandatory, the clause would be incorporated into 
the new agreement unchanged. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge for two reasons. First, after 
reviewing several of our decisions, the ALJ held that the charge 
was moot. She determined that there was no improper insistence 
and no actual controversy because the clause had been withdrawn 
from fact-finding. On the merits, the ALJ held the clause to be 
mandatory as involving disciplinary penalties, disagreeing with 
an earlier decision on a similar negotiability question by a 
different ALJ.2/ 
The District argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing the 
charge as moot and in finding the clause mandatorily negotiable. 
It argues that the demand is rendered nonmandatory by the 
inclusion of the phrase "or deprived of any professional 
advantage". The Association supports the AKT's decision. 
^Peekskill City Sch. Dist. , 16 PERB ?[3075 (1983) . 
^Mohonason Teachers Ass'n, 14 PERB [^4604 (1981) . 
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For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the ALT insofar 
as she held the charge to be moot, but affirm her dismissal on 
the basis that the clause in issue is mandatorily negotiable. 
The District argues that the charge is properly before us 
for consideration of the negotiability of the Association's 
demand under our decision in Seneca Falls Teachers 
Association.-7 In that case, the Board assessed the 
negotiability of a demand in circumstances substantially the same 
as those here. We there indicated that parties could, by mutual 
agreement, consent to the Board's issuance of a bargaining 
determination and thereby effectively waive any mootness defense. 
In dismissing the charge, the ALT relied upon the following 
two cases decided after Seneca Falls Teachers Association. In 
Buffalo Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (hereafter 
Buffalo),-/ a union withdrew during the course of proceedings on 
an improper practice charge a demand which it had submitted in a 
petition for compulsory interest arbitration. The City in that 
case had complained that the demand which had been submitted by 
the union was not mandatorily negotiable. Although the City 
wanted a determination on the negotiability of the withdrawn 
demand, we declined to make a negotiability determination because 
in our view, given the withdrawal of the demand, "no purpose is 
i723 PERB 53032 (1990). 
^23 PERB f3036 (1990) . 
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served by our making a scope determination at this time".-7 In 
dismissing, however, we observed that there could be "special 
circumstances"-'' which would warrant our making a scope 
determination notwithstanding the withdrawal of a demand. 
Our most recent discussion of mootness is found in City of 
Peekskill,-7 a unilateral change case. The charges filed by one 
of the unions in that case were dismissed as moot because 
contracts had been reached which effectively rescinded the change 
in practice. We held that traditional mootness concepts could be 
applied in our improper practice proceedings and stated that we 
would no longer follow any prior decisions holding or suggesting 
to the contrary. At the same time, however, we recognized in 
City of Peekskill that "the application of a mootness concept is 
controlled by the particular facts of the case and applied only 
to the extent consistent with the policies of the Act".-7 
The ALJ concluded that our decisions in the latter two cases 
required a dismissal of this charge as moot notwithstanding our 
earlier decision on the merits in Seneca Falls Teachers 
Association. We find, however, no inconsistency in the cases 
cited by and relied upon by the ALJ, and conclude that the 
^
7Id. at 3073. 
^Id. 
7
-'26 PERB ?[3062 (1993) . 
5/Id. at 3109. 
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negotiability question in this case was not mooted by intervening 
events. 
In circumstances in which the parties specifically agree to 
the preservation of a scope of negotiation question and, thereby, 
rely upon our assessment of negotiability to determine a term of 
their agreement, there are presented the "special circumstances" 
we spoke of in Buffalo which warrant our exercise of 
jurisdiction. Whether the case is never mooted in that 
circumstance or there has been a waiver of a mootness defense is 
largely immaterial. Application of a mootness concept under the 
circumstances presented here would not be "consistent with the 
policies of the Act" for only by reaching the negotiability 
question do we resolve the parties' collective bargaining 
impasse. 
Reaching the merits, we affirm the ALJ's decision that the 
clause in issue is mandatorily negotiable. The clause defines 
and limits both the grounds for the imposition of discipline and 
the penalties which may be invoked upon satisfaction of the 
predicate for disciplinary action. These are clearly mandatorily 
negotiable subjects,-7 even though one or more of the 
"professional advantages" of which a disciplined employee could 
be deprived might conceivably be nonmandatory, e.g., assignment 
of certain duties. There is no restriction upon the exercise of 
2/
 City of Glens Falls. 24 PERB [^3015 (1991) ; City of Buffalo, 
23 PERB 1[3050 (1990) ; New York City Transit Auth. , 20 PERB [^3037 
(1987) ; City of Newburah, 16 PERB [^3030 (1983) . 
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any managerial prerogative because the clause is applicable only 
in the disciplinary context and the District remains privileged 
in that context to effect disciplinary sanction, including the 
loss of "professional advantage", upon a finding of just cause 
for discipline. Because the removal of a professional advantage 
is subject to review only if done for reasons of discipline, and 
not otherwise, the clause is mandatorily negotiable. 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the ALJ's 
mootness determination, but affirm her dismissal of the charge on 
the ground the demand in issue is mandatorily negotiable. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, ( Chairperson 
E r i c J^StShmertz , Member 
; 
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INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Amsterdam School Custodial and Maintenance Unit 
of Montgomery County, Local #829 (CSEA), the current 
representative for a unit of noninstructional employees of the -
Greater Amsterdam School District (District), asks that we review 
a ruling by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) made during the processing of a 
petition filed by the United Public Service Employees Union, 
5 / 4/95 
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Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers District Council 
424 (Local 424). By its petition, Local 424 seeks to replace 
CSEA as the bargaining agent for the existing noninstructional 
unit. 
In May 1994, Local 424 had petitioned to represent this same 
unit. The Director dismissed that petition by decision dated 
January 19, 1995, on the ground that Local 424, as constituted 
when that petition was filed, was not an employee organization as 
defined in §201.5 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act).-' Local 424 withdrew the exceptions it had filed to the 
Director's decision in that case such that the Director's 
dismissal of that earlier petition became final. 
The petition in this case was filed on February 9, 1995. In 
its response to this petition, CSEA alleged that its processing 
was barred by §201.3(g) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), which 
prohibits the filing of a new petition for one year after a 
previous petition to represent the same employees has been 
processed to completion. The Director, however, ruled that the 
petition was not barred because it had not been processed to 
completion within the meaning of Rules §201.3(g). CSEA seeks to 
appeal that ruling. 
-''The Director's decision was based upon our decision in 
Northport/E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist. , 27 PERB ^[3053, 
motion for reconsideration den., 27 PERB f3061 (1994), conf'd sub 
nom. Boyle v. PERB, 28 PERB f7001 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1995). By 
) decision this date in DR-053, we held that changes in Local 424's 
constitutional and operational relationship with the District 
Council were sufficient to bring Local 42 4 within the definition 
of an employee organization under the Act. 
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An appeal at this point of the representation proceeding is 
with our permission only.-7 In the exercise of our discretion 
to consider interlocutory appeals, we will review the Director's 
ruling at this time. The question presented is whether our 
jurisdiction over this representation question has been properly 
invoked or whether the exercise of that jurisdiction is barred by 
existing rule. Moreover, the question presented, is one of law, 
is novel and is of interest and importance to the labor relations 
community generally. 
Section 201.3(g) of the Rules provides that: 
No petition may be filed for a unit which includes job 
titles that were within a unit for which, during the 
preceding 12-month period, a petition was processed to 
completion. (emphasis added) 
The question presented on this appeal is whether Local 424's 
earlier petition was processed to completion under §201.3(g) of 
the Rules. If it was, this petition is barred; if it was not 
processed to completion, this petition may be processed. 
CSEA argues that the dismissal of a petition on the ground 
that the petitioner is not an employee organization is a 
dismissal on the merits or otherwise satisfies the purposes 
sought to be advanced by Rule §201.3(g), such that this petition 
must be dismissed. 
Local 424 argues in response that its earlier petition was 
not processed to completion because the Director's dismissal was 
procedural in nature and did not constitute a determination on 
the merits. 
^Rules §201. 9(c) (4) . 
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We have held that Rules §201.3(g) is triggered by a 
"determination on the merits".-7 We have also held that the 
Rule is not applicable in circumstances in which the prior 
petition has been withdrawn-7 or the petition has been dismissed 
as untimely.-7 
Section 201.3(g) of the Rules is intended to promote labor 
relations stability by affording an employer and an employee 
organization a respite between challenges to either the 
composition of a unit or a union's majority status. Secondarily, 
the Rule seeks to avoid an unnecessary dissipation of both PERB's 
and the parties' resources. Neither of those purposes can 
override, however, the fundamental statutory right of public 
employees to periodically reassess their selection of a 
negotiating agent. Concerns about the expense and temporary 
instability caused by the processing of a representation petition 
are plainly secondary to the employees' rights. 
A determination as to the employee organization status of a 
petitioner is no more "on the merits" than is a timeliness 
dismissal or the closing of a case pursuant to an approved 
withdrawal. Section 201.3(g) of the Rules requires that the 
petition alleged to constitute a bar to the processing of a 
second petition be processed to completion with respect to the 
merits of the representation question or questions presented. 
37Power Auth. of the State of New York, 19 PERB ^3073 (1986). 
) ^Board of Educ. of the City of Yonkers, 10 PERB ^[3100, aff'q 10 
PERB 1[4055 (1977) . 
-
7Power Auth. of the State of New York, supra note 3. 
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A certification/decertification petition raising only a majority 
status question is processed to completion when it resolves that 
question of majority status. 
Although the status of a petitioner may sometimes be in 
dispute, as it was under Local 424's earlier petition, and 
although the resolution of that disputed representation question 
is clearly necessary to the processing of such a petition, it is 
an issue incidental to the basic question of majority status. 
The Director's dismissal of Local 424's first petition did not in 
any way address any aspect of that question. Therefore, Local 
424's first petition was not "processed to completion" within the 
meaning of Rules §201.3(g) and this petition is not barred by 
that Rule. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's ruling that 
Local 424's petition in this matter is not barred by Rules 
§2 01.3(g) is affirmed. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric y.Schmertz, Member 
J 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Troy (City) and cross-exceptions filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Rensselaer County Local 842, City of Troy Unit 8251 (CSEA) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on CSEA's charge 
against the City. After a hearing, the ALT held that the City 
violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it stopped deducting and transmitting CSEA membership 
dues and agency shop fees as required by §2 08.1(b) and §2 08.3(b) 
of the Act, respectively. The ALJ dismissed allegations that the 
cessation of dues and fees checkoff also violated §209-a.l(b) and 
) (d) of the Act. 
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The City argues^ that the ALJ erred by excluding reference 
to and analysis of certain provisions of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement pertaining to agency shop fees. The focus 
of the City's exceptions, however, is upon the ALJ's recommended 
remedial order, which the City alleges is punitive or otherwise 
inconsistent with the policies of the Act in certain respects. 
In its cross-exceptions, CSEA alleges upon information and 
belief that the exceptions are untimely. Substantively, it 
argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing allegations that the 
City's action violated §209-a.l(b) and (d) of the Act. As to 
remedy, CSEA argues that the ALJ also should have ordered the 
City to cease and desist from violating §209-a.l(a) and to 
forward to each employee in CSEA's unit a letter explaining the 
violations found. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse 
in part, and modify the remedial order. 
We note first that the City's exceptions are timely. It 
received the ALJ's decision on March 15, 1995. It filed its 
exceptions by mail on April 5, 1995, within the time allotted by 
§204.10(a) of our Rules of Procedure. 
-'Injunctive relief having been granted by the Supreme Court, 
Albany County in conjunction with this charge (28 PERB J[7002) , 
the case is before us at this time pursuant to the statutory 
preference granted by §209-a.4(g) of the Act. In the interest of 
expedition required by the Act, and because the exceptions and 
cross-exceptions fully set forth the factual and legal issues 
involved, the City's request for oral argument is denied. 
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Next considered are those parts of the exceptions and cross-
exceptions relating to the ALJ's substantive determinations. 
As to the City's exceptions, Article X, sections "E" and "F" 
of the parties' contract, the ones the City argues were 
incorrectly disregarded by the ALJ, are not part of the record. 
The City included in an exhibit to its answer to the charge only 
sections "A" through "D" of Article X. Further, upon inquiry by 
the ALJ at the hearing, the City confirmed that the exhibit 
attached to its answer contained the relevant provisions of the 
contract. The ALJ plainly did not err by not considering 
evidence which is not in the record or arguments which were not 
presented to him. 
Even if official notice were to be taken of sections "E" and 
"F" of the parties' contract, they would not affect the 
disposition of the merits of the charge. These contract 
provisions condition the City's obligations and CSEA's rights to 
agency shop fees upon acquisition and retention of seventy 
percent union membership. There is also "hold harmless" language 
and a clause which limits the City's liability to the remittance 
of actual deductions from wages earned by employees. 
Agency shop fees for employees of local governments were 
mandatory subjects of collective negotiation until 1992. The 
Legislature amended §208.3(b) of the Act that year to make 
municipal employers' deductions of agency shop fees compulsory, 
rather than subject to bargaining, commencing with the first pay 
period after August 23, 1992. Section 208.3(b) of the Act 
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controls the City's agency shop fee deduction obligations, not 
the provisions of any prior contract negotiated at a time when 
the applicable law was different from that governing at the date 
the deductions were stopped.-7 
Those parts of sections "E" and "F" of the contract which 
purport to limit the City's agency shop fee liability have no 
bearing upon the City's statutory obligation to deduct and 
transmit the agency fees. If considered at all, they would be 
relevant only to the remedial order. Having concluded that a 
modification of the remedial order is necessary and appropriate 
to effectuate the policies of the Act for reasons apart from any 
contract question, the relevancy of sections "E" and "F", even as 
to remedy, is, therefore, both academic and immaterial. 
As to CSEA's cross-exceptions, the AKT properly dismissed 
the §209-a.l(b) allegation. That subsection of the Act is 
intended to ensure that an employee organization serves as the 
independent representative of the unit employees by proscribing 
employer domination or unlawful assistance or support.-7 CSEA's 
independence was not compromised by the City's cessation of the 
-'The record does not reveal exactly when contract sections "E" 
and "F" were first negotiated. The language dates back to at 
least the mid-1980s and probably back to the late 1970s when the 
City began deducting agency shop fees. 
1;See generally City of Buffalo,.15 PERB f3123 (1982), aff'd sub 
nom. Buffalo PBA v. Newman, 97 A.D.2d 574, 16 PERB [^7025 (3d 
Dep't 1983); County of Onondaga and County of Onondaga Sheriff, 
14 PERB U[3029 (1981) ; County of Rockland and Rockland County 
Community College, 13 PERB [^3089 (1980) ; Board of Educ. of the 
City Sch. Dist. of the City of Albany, 6 PERB ^3012 (1973). 
Board - U-16301 -5 
dues and fees deductions, regardless of the motives for that 
action. 
We reverse, however, the ALJ's decision insofar as he 
dismissed the §209-a.l(d) allegation. 
The City's refusal to deduct and transmit membership dues 
and agency shop fees was a form of economic interference with 
employees' statutory rights and per se unlawful.-7 We have held 
that even a threat of unlawful economic pressure during 
negotiations is "inimical to good faith negotiations".-'' If the 
threat of such action is improper, a fortiori, the actual doing 
of the unlawful act is improper. 
Although recognizing the legal framework for analysis of the 
§209-a.l(d) allegation, the ALJ dismissed it upon the conclusion 
that there was insufficient evidence that the City's refusal to 
deduct and transmit the dues and fees was linked to the parties' 
collective negotiations. The record, however, shows persuasively 
that the City decided to stop all dues and fee deductions in an 
effort to influence the outcome of negotiations being held 
pursuant to a voluntary reopening of the parties' existing 
agreement. 
-'See Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 25 PERB [^3044 (1992) , 
rev'd on other grounds, 198 A.D.2d 824, 26 PERB f7015 (4th 
Dep't), motion for leave to appeal den., 81 N.Y.2d 706 (1993). 
Although the case involved agency shop fee deductions only, the 
rationale is equally applicable to dues deductions. 
^East Meadow Teachers Ass'n, 16 PERB ?[3086, at 3142 (1983) 
(strike threat). 
Board - U-163 01 -6 
Until it stopped the deductions in November 1994 during the 
reopener negotiations and after a tentative agreement had been 
rejected by CSEA, the City had a long-standing, uninterrupted 
history of dues and fee deductions without question as to the 
adequacy of payroll deduction authorizations. The City's order 
stopping the deductions was not tailored to meet the 
circumstances which allegedly prompted it, for.it applied to all 
unit employees, including those for whom no membership 
"discrepancies" had been uncovered, as well as agency shop fee 
payers who do not authorize deductions in any way. Moreover, the 
City Manager stated during negotiations that the order stopping 
the deductions would be withdrawn and that it would "go away" if 
) 
a tentative agreement were to be ratified by CSEA's membership. 
These facts, when coupled with the timing of the City's actions, 
establish the linkage between the unlawful cessation of the 
deductions and the collective negotiations necessary to support a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
We turn now to a consideration of the ALJ's recommended 
remedial order. 
The ALJ ordered, inter alia, the City to pay CSEA from "City 
funds" any dues and fees owed to CSEA which remained uncollected 
despite the alternative collection methods CSEA had instituted in 
response to the City's action. He also ordered the City to 
reimburse CSEA for the reasonable expenses it incurred in that 
collection effort. The City excepts to the ALJ's order in these 
) 
respects. 
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Under §205.5(d) of the Act, it is our right and obligation 
upon finding an improper practice to have been committed to order 
such remedial relief as will effectuate the policies of the Act 
and it is that principle which both guides and limits our 
remedial determination. 
Our remedial order is shaped in a unique context. The 
City's obligation to deduct dues and fees was clear and its 
cessation of all but a few of those deductions, at best, was 
without colorable defense. Its action was, as noted, inimical to 
the bargaining process, it compromised and continues to 
compromise the relationship between CSEA and its members and 
nonmembers, and it reflects a complete disregard for the duties 
imposed upon it under law. If exemplary damages were within the 
range of options available to us, an award in that regard would 
be appropriate. Our power, however, is remedial only and we are 
constrained to conclude that in making a good-faith, and not 
unreasonable, effort to redress egregious wrongs, the ALJ 
exceeded the scope of our purely remedial relief powers by 
ordering the City to pay CSEA from its own funds. 
Although the ALJ's order does not prohibit the City from 
recouping the monies paid from its treasury in negotiations with 
CSEA, and that appears to have been what he contemplated, the 
ALJ's order exempts certain unit employees from an obligation 
which is theirs alone and shifts that obligation, however 
temporarily, to the City. Pursuant to §208.1(b) and §208.3(b) of 
the Act, the dues and fees are to be paid by the employees. The 
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employer is merely the statutory agent for the deduction and 
transmittal of those monies, thereby ensuring both payment by the 
employees and receipt of the monies by the union representative. 
The City itself was never required to pay any monies to CSEA and 
we cannot create a statutory duty or responsibility when it has 
been lodged elsewhere by the Legislature, despite the impropriety 
of the City's cessation of dues and fee deductions. Moreover, 
the ALJ's order in this respect does not best effectuate the 
policies of the Act because it exempts those unit employees who 
did not pay their dues and fees voluntarily from an obligation to 
pay, at least for a time, thereby further aggravating the 
division among employees caused by the City's action. 
Having determined that the part of the ALJ's order requiring 
the City to pay CSEA with City funds is not appropriate, we need 
not consider the City's arguments which are wholly contingent 
upon our affirmance of that part of the ALJ's order.-7 
A sum of money equal to the dues and fees not deducted and 
remaining uncollected, however, is still owed to CSEA. The total 
amount is certain, as is the method of calculation and the 
-''The City argues that payment of dues and fees from City funds 
represents support of CSEA in violation of §2 09-a.l(b) of the Act 
and that the portion of the agency fees which represent CSEA's 
expenditures in aid of political or ideological causes should be 
offset from any payment obligation. The ALJ also ordered 
interest on the monies to be paid by the City. Having determined 
that monetary relief in this form is not appropriate, interest is 
not properly ordered. Waverly Cent. Sch. Dist. , 19 PERB 5[3 08 0 
(1986). It is appropriately ordered, however, in conjunction 
with the order requiring reimbursement of reasonable collection 
expenses. 
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persons responsible for the payment. It is the schedule of 
collection which creates the remedial dilemma. That schedule 
clearly cannot be at the City's direction for that would have the 
wrongdoer establish the remedy for its own statutory violation. 
It cannot be established through collective negotiations for that 
would make negotiable what is a statutory entitlement and it 
would further delay CSEA's receipt of monies owed to it since 
November 1994. To have the collection schedule established by 
CSEA would force it to make the very types of decisions which we 
knew would be divisive of its membership and which led us to seek 
injunctive relief in connection with this case. Therefore, the 
only viable option is for us to establish the collection 
schedule, including the amounts to be deducted from the 
employees' checks, after permitting the parties an opportunity to 
submit arguments or position statements on these issues, such 
papers to be filed with us within seven working days after their 
receipt of this decision. Thereafter, we will issue the 
appropriate supplemental order as necessary. 
The ALJ's order in all other respects is remedial only and 
plainly necessary and appropriate to effectuate the policies of 
the Act. Even if CSEA's effort to collect the dues and fees 
wrongfully withheld from it were not required under a mitigation 
of damages principle, its efforts in that regard were clearly 
permissible. The City denied CSEA its statutory entitlements and 
the City cannot now be heard to complain that CSEA should not be 
reimbursed for the expenses it reasonably incurred in an effort 
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to obtain what had been illegally withheld from it. Such 
reimbursement constitutes make-whole relief, not punitive 
damages, and is clearly within our authority to order. The exact 
expenses which CSEA is entitled to have reimbursed will be fixed, 
if and as necessary, through subsequent compliance investigation 
and enforcement proceedings, as is our policy and practice. 
CSEA's exceptions to the AIJT's remedial order are denied. 
The order we have entered fully remedies the violations found. 
As the AKJ determined, the broad cease and desist order CSEA 
seeks is unnecessary and inappropriate, as is the individualized 
notice to unit employees. 
Having found the City to have violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) 
of the Act, IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City: 
1. Commencing with the next pay period, and continuing 
thereafter, resume the deduction from the salary or 
wages of any and all nonmembers of CSEA who are 
included in the negotiating unit it represents an 
amount equivalent to the dues levied by CSEA and 
transmit the sums so deducted to CSEA.-7 
2. Commencing with the next pay period, and continuing 
thereafter, except for those members of CSEA for whom 
CSEA has waived the payment of dues, resume the 
-
7The payroll deductions of agency shop fees from the salary or 
wages of any CSEA nonmembers must be in an amount equal to that 
of the membership dues deductions and those deductions must be 
upon the same conditions as are applicable to membership dues 
deductions. 
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deduction from the salary or wages of any and all 
members of CSEA who have presented executed dues 
deduction authorization cards pursuant to §208.1(b) of 
the Act an amount for the payment of his or her 
membership dues in CSEA and transmit the sums so 
deducted to CSEA.5/ 
3. Make CSEA whole for any reasonable expenses that it 
incurred in collecting membership dues and agency shop 
fees from unit employees by virtue of the City's 
cessation of membership dues and agency shop fee 
deductions and transmissions, until such time as the 
City resumes those deductions and transmissions in 
accordance with its obligations under the Act, with 
interest on the sum owed at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
4. Deduct from the salary or wages of the unit employees 
described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order herein the 
amount of the dues and agency shop fees not received by 
CSEA, such deductions to be made, and thereafter 
transmitted to CSEA, pursuant to the terms of the 
Board's supplemental order to be rendered following 
receipt of any position statements filed by the parties 
§/; If the City has already resumed dues and fee deductions 
consistent with the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of our 
order, no further action pursuant to those paragraphs is 
J required. Those parts of the order will then have application 
only for continuing enforcement purposes. 
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within seven working days after their receipt of the 
decision and order herein. 
5. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA by desisting from 
discontinuing membership dues or agency shop fee 
deductions pursuant to §208 of the Act as a negotiating 
tactic. 
6. Sign and post the attached notice at all places 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to CSEA 
unit employees. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
'aulin^  R. Kinsella, Pauling Chairperson 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the bargaining unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Rensselaer County Local 842, City of Troy Unit 8251 (CSEA), that the City of Troy will: 
1. Commencing with the next pay period, and continuing thereafter, resume the deduction from the salary 
or wages of any and all nonmembers of CSEA who are included in the negotiating unit it represents an 
amount equivalent to the dues levied by CSEA and transmit the sums so deducted to CSEA. 
2. Commencing with the next pay period, and continuing thereafter, except for those members for whom 
CSEA has waived the payment of dues, resume the deduction from the salary or wages of any and all 
) members of CSEA who have presented executed dues deduction authorization cards pursuant to §208.1 (b) 
of the Act an amount for the payment of his or her membership dues in CSEA and transmit the sums so 
deducted to CSEA. 
3. Make CSEA whole for any reasonable expenses that it incurred in collecting membership dues and agency 
shop fees from unit employees by virtue of the City's cessation of membership dues and agency shop fee 
deductions and transmissions, until such time as the City resumes those deductions and transmissions 
in accordance with its obligations under the Act, with interest on the sum owed at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
4. Deduct from the salary or wages of the unit employees described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order herein 
the amount of the dues and agency shop fees not received by CSEA, such deductions to be made, and 
thereafter transmitted to CSEA, pursuant to the terms of the Board's supplemental order to be rendered 
following receipt of any position statements filed by the parties within seven working days after their 
receipt of the decision and order herein. 
5. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA by desisting from discontinuing membership dues or agency shop fee 
deductions pursuant to §208 of the Act as a negotiating tactic. 
Dated By , 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY OF TROY 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CASE NOS. D-0258 
MOUNT VERNON FEDERATION OP TEACHERS, D-0259 
D-0260 
Respondent, 
upon—the Charge—of—Violation of 
§210.1 of the Civil Service Law 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On March 14, 1995, this agency's office of counsel, filed 
three charges alleging that the Mount Vernon Federation of 
Teachers (Federation) had violated Civil Service Law (CSL) 
§210.1. The charges alleged that the Federation had caused, 
instigated, encouraged, or condoned strikes against the Mount 
Vernon City School District by employees in the teachers, teacher 
aides, and monitors bargaining units represented by the 
Federation, on September 9, 1994. The charges have been 
consolidated for decision. 
The charges respectively allege that 50 out of 91 employees 
in the teacher aides unit, 28 out of 31 employees in the monitors 
unit, and 63 6 out of 757 employees in the teachers unit, 
participated in the respective strikes. 
The Federation requested the associate counsel to indicate 
the penalties he would be willing to recommend to this Board as 
appropriate for the violations alleged. The associate counsel 
proposed, for each bargaining unit, a penalty of the suspension 
of the Federation's right to dues and agency shop fee deductions 
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to the extent of twenty-five percent of the amount that would 
otherwise be deducted during a year.-7 
By mutual agreement, the Federation's time to answer these 
charges has been extended, with the understanding that the 
associate—counsel—would—recommend—those penal-ties—andthat—this 
Board would approve them. The associate counsel has made that 
recommendation, and we determine that the recommended penalties 
are reasonable and will effectuate the policies of the Act. 
WE ORDER, as to each of the at-issue bargaining units, that 
the dues and agency shop fee deduction rights of the Mount Vernon 
Federation of Teachers be suspended, starting on the first 
practicable date, and continuing for the period of time during 
which twenty-five percent of its annual dues and agency shop 
fees, if any, would otherwise have been deducted on its behalf by 
the Mount Vernon City School District, and until the Federation 
affirms that it no longer asserts the right to strike against any 
government, as required by CSL §210.3(g). 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chai rperson 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
1/ This is intended to be the equivalent of a three-month 
suspension of dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges 
if deductions had been withheld in twelve monthly 
installments. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
( ^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOMERS SCHOOL RELATED PERSONNEL, 
Petitioner, 
__^and- CASE-NO C=A3SSL 
SOMERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Somers School Related 
Personnel has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time clerical, custodial, cafeteria, 
teacher aides, bus attendants, couriers, and 
school monitor personnel. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-4359 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Somers School Related 
Personnel. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
j£aiih_wi-th_respeci_to_wages_,_hours-,_and—o.thex__t.erms_and
 : 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
WdfrZ^%]f+<vt\ 
Pau l ine R. K m s e l l a , Chairperson 
Er/±c J . Schmertz, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PEARL RIVER TEACHING ASSISTANTS ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NEW YORK, 
Petitioner, 
=^and^ CASE-NO- C=A3A9. 
PEARL RIVER UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND 
JOINERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 964, AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Pearl River Teaching 
Assistants Association, NEA/New York has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and. the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4349 page 2 
Unit: Included: All full and part-time teaching assistants. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with the Pearl River 
Teaching Assistants Association, NEA/New York. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession.. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Eric /S. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 45 6, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OP 
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
and &AS-E—N0—C—4-2-4-3-
TOWN OF CORTLANDT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
found to be appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Bookkeeper, Program Coordinator, Youth 
Advocate, Recreation Supervisor, Planning 
Director, 'Assistant Planning Director, 
Assessor, Building Inspector, Court Clerk, 
Deputy Director of Code Enforcement, Deputy 
Comptroller, Deputy Town Engineer, Deputy 
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Planning Director, Deputy Superintendent of 
Highways, Deputy Town Clerk, Director of 
Nutrition, Purchasing Director, Recreation 
Supervisor I, and Youth Service Coordinator. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with Local 456, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Eric/^T. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
OWEGO-APALACHIN ADMINISTRATORS AND 
SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION/SAANYS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4229 
OWEGO-APALACHIN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Owego-Apalachin Admin-
istrators and Supervisors Association/SAANYS has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Principals,"Assistant Principals, Supervisor of 
Buildings and Grounds, Supervisor of 
Transportation, Supervisor of Food Services, 
Athletic Director, Director of Computer 
Services, Director of Special Services and 
Director of Education. 
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Excluded: Assistant Superintendent of Business and 
Director of Operations. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Owego-Apalachin Admin-
istrators— and—Supervisors—Associat-ion/SAANYS The—duty—to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of'employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 4, 1995 
Albany, New York 
